Conference on Disarmament (CD) - Topics
Committee Chairs: Fabian Grass, Jun-Hwan Park
Contact: cd@zagimun.org
The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the world's single multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body. The Conference was founded to treat all aspects of disarmament as for example the prevention of arms races, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or transparency in armaments and national military budgets. Despite its consensus-based working method, the CD has successfully negotiated major multilateral disarmament and arms control treaties as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Convention on chemical weapons or the convention on bacteriological weapons.
Since 1998, the Conference on Disarmament is however deadlocked and no consensus on an agenda (called program of work) could be found. It is up to the ZAGIMUN participants to find a way to overcome this dormant state of being. We will discuss the issues of missile proliferation and missile defense as well as the recent developments in the field of low-yield nuclear weapons, also known as "mini-nukes".
Topic A
Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense
Missiles matter. Being a delivery system of a payload/warhead, an incredible range of missiles exists today. While the issue of ammunition was addressed in discussions on nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons, missiles constitute an important gap in today's disarmament efforts.
Missiles are complex and their use range from small-range Katyusha rockets which Hezbollah recently fired on Israeli population, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to long-range tactical missiles. The range of use of missiles is thus ever broadening and new technologies make disarmament in this field increasingly difficult, complex and interlinked.
The ZAGIMUN Conference on Disarmament will focus on ballistic missiles (i.e. missiles that follow a ballistic trajectory) and cruise missiles only (low-flying vehicles that hit a target directly). Proliferations of these weapons contradict the goal of disarmament and threaten to offset regional security complexes and global stability.
Missile stockpiles have been reduced significantly since the beginning of the "détente" in the 1970s and the end of the Cold War. Many tactical short- and long-range missiles have been dismantled or destroyed following the bilateral arms limitation and arms reduction treaties (see SALT and START agreements). Recent developments in missile proliferation and missile defense (i.e. systems that aim at intercepting incoming missiles) are however alarming. New types of ballistic missiles, interception systems and cruise missiles as well as submarine-launch systems change the nature of conflict and strategic stability.
The current distribution of missiles classified according to their range equals a pyramidal system: On the top of it, only the five official nuclear weapon states possess long-range ballistic missiles with a range of 5.500-13.000km (called Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles [ICBM]). The second class of states with missiles that have a range over 1.000-5.500km is composed of only 6 states. The third and last class of states, having missiles under 1.000km firing capabilities, consists of around 20 states.
Vertical proliferation (i.e. increased stocks or more sophisticated missiles) is strongly linked to horizontal missile proliferation (i.e. more states being in possession of missiles). In particular stocks of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM; 1.000-3.000km) and of cruise missiles- which are more accurate, easier to acquire and much cheaper to produce- have significantly increased in scope worldwide. Beliefs also matter a great deal in missile proliferation, and perception of the adversary's military capabilities and the fallacious faith in the classic concept of deterrence have an important stake in the current increase in stockpiles.
Missile proliferation is finally interlinked with developments in missile defense. The US-plan for a missile defense system in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world has triggered new developments in the field of missile technology and proliferation. The missile defense system which is supposed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles has led Russia, China and other nations to doubt in the credibility of the deterrent of their missile stocks. Modernization programs, new proliferation initiatives have resulted in sophisticated missile technologies as the development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) i.e. warheads that are guidable in their re-entry phase in order to circumvent the missile defense shield. An important number of states such as China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and Syria have tested new systems and are developing missiles that are more reliable, faster, longer-ranging and less interceptable.
No international instrument exists today to comprehensively address the issue of missile proliferation (and missile defense). Several attempts as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), the US-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the report on missiles of the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts (UNPGE) or the Russian proposal for a Global Control System (GCS) remain either limited in scope or strictly voluntary.
The ZAGIMUN Conference on Disarmament shall find new ways in order to deal with these new trends and developments. A possible outcome may be a ban on further missile proliferation, a reduction in stockpiles, a limitation of certain types of weapons or for example a test ban. Verification issues or other trade-offs as exchange on missile launch data, negative security assurances (NSA) or other confidence-building measures (CBM) may surely be discussed in order to get an acceptable “package solution”. The issue of missile defense may surely be addressed in the committee but should be seen as secondary issue as it is also a direct consequence of missile proliferation. The topic of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) should be avoided as it is broader and concerns the actual deployment in space of offensive or nuclear weapons.
In order to negotiate a treaty, the CD needs prior consensus on a program of work which will include the mandate of the ad hoc committee charged to draft the treaty. In real life, the treaty the ad hoc committee has agreed upon would be submitted again to the CD for final adoption. In order not to further complicate the confusing working methods of the Conference, the ZAGIMUN-CD will limit its work to the point an agreement on the mandate of the ad hoc committee is agreed upon.
Keep in mind, the Conference on Disarmament works with consensus rule. Heated political debates and unholy alliances in our committee will be guaranteed!
Topic B
Robust Earth Penetrating Weapons aka (mini-nukes)
The United States have updated their national security strategy against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and released their Nuclear Posture Review in 2002. This document calls for more effective means for "counter-proliferation" i.e. against the possession and spread of WMDs. In particular, the development of “small” nuclear earth penetrating weapons that are able to take out deep-buried targets regarding chemical, biological or nuclear weapons is pushed forward. These low-yield nuclear weapons, also called mini-nukes, are equipped with a limited explosive power of "only" the equivalent of 0.01-5 kilotons of TNT. This type of nuclear weaponry was banned by U.S. congress in 1993, but had its ban rescinded in 2004.
Proponents of this new type of weapon stress their utility as a precise tactical weapon which would also reduce collateral damage (the nuclear contamination would be much smaller and geographically concentrated than that of an average strategic nuclear bomb). Scientists however heavily doubt in the feasibility of developing a weapon capable of penetrating enough meters of concrete or earth to reach deeply buried bunkers and facilities. Dr. Robert Nelson of the Federation of American Scientists has published studies demonstrating the physical impossibility of a Robust Nuclear Earth-Penetrator (RNEP). There are certain velocity thresholds in which the carrier will deform / collapse, and be susceptible to the diverse layers of composition of the earth, therefore being inadequate in its precision or potential reach (depth).
Furthermore, analysts have said that no missile could bury enough in order contain the radioactive fallout. A calculation by Dr. Nelson states that a one kiloton earth-penetrating “mini-nuke” would spread out its radioactive fallout for several square kilometers, making the collateral damage of this weapon no-longer strategically contained, but as weapon which would call the attention of the international community, and deter the possibilities of peaceful resolutions.
The prospect of further development in the field of low-yield nuclear weapons has important implications for international security and multilateral disarmament in general. Nuclear weapons have been tested many times on land, underground, under water or in the atmosphere but they have been used only twice within living memory. The availability of low-yield nuclear weapons will greatly diminish the reluctance and restraint to use nuclear weapons in conventional warfare or for preventive purposes.
The acknowledgment over the necessity of research for a more effective weapon of nuclear material deems itself to be in conflict with the counter-proliferation efforts. During the current presidency, the U.S. president George W. Bush has revised the military army long term strategy and has emphasized through great funding that he finds necessary for the army to become smaller, agile, modern, and nuclear. Low-yield nuclear weaponry research and development is in direct result of the new long-term strategy.
Current U.S. intelligence shows that there are over 10,000 deep buried facilities in “unfriendly” states in which they state that over 10% of them serve key-functions within their networks. The US-Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has been a key component in analyzing the feasibility of an Earth penetrating nuclear tactical weapon in order to make these deep buried facilities a target. The bunkers can many times be situated in civilian areas to strategically use civilians as cloak and protection from a direct attack.
A widely proclaimed testing done by the U.S. was done in February 2007, codenamed “Divine Strake”, and it consisted of a non-nuclear Earth Penetrating explosion which would simulate the kinetic debris energy of the low-yield nuclear component. This testing undisclosed the fact that the low-yield nuclear weapons program is an integral part of their new military strategy being done.
The issue behind the low-yield nuclear weapons program is not its destructive status. WMD are of greater threat, but the combination of conventional warfare with nuclear weaponry can act as a rapid deterrent agent, bringing confusion and tension regarding nuclear proliferation, utility, and usage. The issues have been addressed in the past, and have resulted with agreements such as the NPT that have aided the end of disregard and confusion regarding nuclear proliferation. Never the less, the new technological advances in weapon systems and new political approaches have left established policy to become resurging issues in today's disarmament conflicts.
Furthermore, rising tensions among states which take their national sovereignty as an umbrella to refuse compliance with the international community, it has become clear that rising tensions cannot be ignored, and must be addressed through peaceful multilateral agreements that should be brokered by the Conference on Disarmament. Examples of rising tensions can be found Russia's department of defense which in response to the possibility that nuclear testing would re-commence by the U.S. warned, if any of the five official nuclear states began nuclear testing, then Russia could deem necessary to re-commence their own stockpile manipulation.
Concerns within the international community can be specially seen with rising tensions by aggressive lobbying can be seen by states such as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea (DPRK),U.S., Israel, Japan, India, Pakistan, China and Russia. Disputes have been re-opened regarding nuclear research and development, nuclear testing, and the usage of this technology. Arsenal stock-piling, research and development on new nuclear weapons, and new enrichment plants by member states are just some of the issues that are re-open in a very alarming global society.
The ZAGIMUN Conference on Disarmament will have to discuss possibilities to manage the new differences regarding nuclear weaponry. An example of what the CD could mandate an ad hoc committee to take on the limiting or reducing stockpiles for min-nukes, both at research and development stage, or production stage. Reaching consensus on the appropriate mechanism will only be setting down the road-work for negotiations and treaties to be signed.
The impact of new nuclear weaponry on international disarmament will be analyzed in the ZAGIMUN Conference on Disarmament. Although seeming more technical, the issue of mini-nukes is very current and central in the field of nuclear weapons discussion. The recent recommendations of the US and Israeli armed forces to take out the underground Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities are just one example of the topicality of this new type of weapon.
