Security Council (SC) - Topics
Committee Chairs: Rami Rasamny, Davor Labaš
Contact: sc@zagimun.org
Topic A
Post Conflict Peacebuilding in Kosovo
Time Line of the Conflict - Brief Kosovo Crisis History
1989 - Milosevic staged vast rally of Serbs in Kosovo, revoked Kosovo's autonomy, and instituted "emergency measures".
1991 - Albanians were expelled en masse from state institutions: police, education, state companies
1991-1995 Belgrade neither fully reasserted nor fully relinquished authority in Kosovo. Police and army had security mastery, but allowed Albanians' parallel institutions to function.
1995 - Albanian radicals,formed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
1998 - Fighting between KLA and Serbian police and security forces broke out, and quickly swept Kosovo.
October 1998 - Following from UN Security Council resolution, NATO demanded end to violence and ceasefire. U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke brokered deal with Milosevic to reduce Yugoslav security force presence, allow in OSCE observers and accept NATO aerial verification.
1999 - parties summoned to Rambouillet, France, as violence continued. Milosevic, having initially appeared to accept, eventually refused internationally-backed Rambouillet Kosovo governance accords. Even as negotiations were underway Serbian security forces began major offensive, undermining Milosevic’s credibility and breaking any commitments made to Holbrooke previous year.
March 1999 - NATO air-strikes began without UN approval and lasted 78 days, with increasing range of targets throughout rump Yugoslavia. Yugoslav army and police retaliated with mass expulsion of Albanian population to Macedonia and Albania.Milosevic capitulated June and NATO’s Kosovo force (KFOR) deployed. Kosovo became UN protectorate under UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) through UNSC resolution 1244.
November 2001 - general election ended with grand coalition government. Ibrahim Rugova became president.
October 2005 - Former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari appointed Special UN Envoy to lead final status talks November 2005. Contact Group gave strongest indication that independence is favoured outcome January 2006, stating any settlement must be acceptable to people of Kosovo.
February and March 2006 - First rounds of face-to-face final status talks, held in Vienna, focusing on decentralization.
Post War Kosovo
The United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1244 placing Kosovo under a transitional UN administration (UNMIK). UNMIK has been segregated into four sections or “pillars.” These are:
- Police and Justice (UN-led)
- Civil and Administration (UN-led)
- Democratization and institution building (led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
- Reconstruction and economic development (led by the European Union)
Resolution 1244 also gave UN assent to KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping initiative which has achieved results albeit in limited fields. According to the Resolution UNMIK has been assigned a myriad of tasks ranging from security to reconstruction and civil development. UNMIK is to:
- Perform basic civilian administrative functions;
- promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;
- facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status;
- coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies;
- support the reconstruction of key infrastructure;
- maintain civil law and order;
- promote human rights; and
- assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.
Since its adoption UNMIK has created a Constitutional Framework for Kosovo that established the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) including an elected Kosovo Assembly, Presidency and office of Prime Minister.
The UN’s special envoy Martti Ahtisaari released the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement on February 2, 2007. A link to the proposal can be found below under the subheading Links. The proposal outlined the need for Kosovo to be self governing. However, under the plan Kosovo would not be granted complete autonomy. As expected, the proposals were met domestically with both praise and fierce opposition. Kosovo Albanians have accepted, though reluctantly, the status package whilst the Serbs have rejected the provisions therein. Furthermore, the proposals contain no mention of independence, which the Kosovo Albanians see as an attempt to deny the “will of the people.”
There is little doubt that UNMIK has achieved much in the last eight years. However, there have been serious criticisms. After eight years of work:
- Key infrastructure is not reconstructed;
- UNMIK has been slow to transfer competencies to the provisional Kosovo institutions;
- Inter-ethnic violence has occasionally flared;
- Corruption, including allegations of corruption within UNMIK, remains endemic;
- Human rights have been problematic;
- There has been a failure to eliminate parallel structures, insofar as health and education within the Kosovo Serbian community remain dependant on Serbian budgets;
- UNMIK has been accused of failing to implement an economic development strategy;
- SC Resolution 1244 authorizes Serbia to send a specific amount of its troops to Kosovo. UNMIK prevented this;
- Illegal Serb intelligence and interior forces continue to operate in Kosovo;
Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs have also criticized UNMIK for failing to stop alleged reprisals or ethnic cleansing against Roma and Serb communities in Kosovo.
Recently, the current US administration has been placing diplomatic pressure in order to achieve independence for Kosovo. However, the Russian authority has been active and vocal in opposing such a move. Tensions between the Russian and American delegations were particularly high during this past G8 summit in Germany where the Russians threatened to veto any resolution granting independence. Observers have been quick to draw parallels between the current Russo-American exchange and rhetoric of the Cold War.
Links
http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Kosovo.asp http://www.nato.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm http://www.un.int/usa/sres1244.htm http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1203.htm
Topic B
Small Arms and Light Weapons
The Issue
Small arms are the fuel to any contemporary domestic or international conflict. The international community condemns conflict and is quick to denounce violence. However, response to conflict has been limited to condemnation with little action. Whilst the international community has disapproved of the fighting in the Gaza strip, it is no secret that world powers have continued to arm the fighting factions. This is but one example of many. The conflict in Liberia, the current Darfur crisis, the Lebanese Civil War, The crisis in East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda, Uganda, Iraq, Afghanistan, are further examples. Small arms have also been the driving force behind the organized crime and international terrorism. The unfortunate truth is that the small arms trade is one of the most lucrative businesses for both individuals and governments. This is perhaps one of the reasons why it has been given limited attention and often met with intense opposition.
The growing availability of small arms has been a major factor in the increase in the number of conflicts, and in hindering smoother rebuilding and development after a conflict has ended. It is estimated, for example, that there are around half a billion military small arms around the world. Some 300,000 to half a million people around the world are killed by them each year. They are the major cause of civilian casualties in modern conflicts. Modern conflicts claim an estimated half a million people each year. 300,000 of these are from conflicts, and 200,000 are from homicides and suicides. Over 80 percent of all these casualties have been civilian, and 90 percent of civilian casualties are caused by small arms. This is far higher than the casualty count from conventional weapons of war like tanks, bomber jets or warships. Estimates of the black market trade in small arms range from US$2-10 billion a year. Every minute, someone is killed by a gun. At least 1,134 companies in 98 countries worldwide are involved in some aspect of the production of small arms and/or ammunition. Civilians purchase more than 80% of all the firearms that are currently manufactured worldwide each year. There are at least 639 million firearms in the world today, of which 59% are legally held by civilians.
International Opinion
“It has been estimated that there are now about 500 million small arms and light weapons in circulation in the world, one for every twelve people. Gone long ago is the time when we Europeans could subdue other continents because we had firearms and the local peoples had not. In 1999 it was reported that an AK-47 assault rifle could be bought in Uganda for the price of a chicken.”
- Robert Neild, Public Corruption; The Dark Side of Social Evolution, (London: Anthem Press, 2002), p. 131
“The lack of arms controls allows some to profit from the misery of others.
- While international attention is focused on the need to control weapons of mass destruction, the trade in conventional weapons continues to operate in a legal and moral vacuum.
- More and more countries are starting to produce small arms, many with little ability or will to regulate their use.
- Permanent UN Security Council members—the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China—dominate the world trade in arms.
- Most national arms controls are riddled with loopholes or barely enforced.
- Key weaknesses are lax controls on the brokering, licensed production, and “end use” of arms.
- Arms get into the wrong hands through weak controls on firearm ownership, weapons management, and misuse by authorised users of weapons.”
— The Arms Bazaar, Shattered Lives, Chapter 4, p. 54, Control Arms Campaign, October 2003
John Bolton, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control, bluntly told the delegates that “The United States will not join consensus on a final document that contains measures contrary to our constitutional right to keep and bear arms.” He also said the United States, the largest supplier of arms worldwide, would not support moves to outlaw any arming of rebel groups, nor would it help fund a campaign by human rights groups to raise awareness of the trade. He also said the U.S. would not support a ban on private ownership of military weapons, including assault rifles and grenade launchers.”
— Amy Goodman, A Ban on Private Ownership of Military Weapons Including Assault Rifles and Grenade Launchers? Bush Administration Just Says No, Democracy Now!, July 11, 2001. (An interview with various activists and campaigners around the world on the UN Conference on small arms)
The Solution
Please refer to the Summary website: http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/files/aconf192_15.pdf
As IANSA summarized, the programme of action commits governments to:
- Make illicit gun production/possession a criminal offence
- Establish a national coordination agency on small arms
- Identify and destroy stocks of surplus weapons
- Keep track of officially-held guns
- Issue end-user certificates for exports/transit
- Notify the original supplier nation of re-export
- Disarmament, Demobilisation & Re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants, including collection and destruction of their weapons
- Support regional agreements and encourage moratoria
- Mark guns at point of manufacture for identification and tracing
- Maintain records of gun manufacture
- Engage in more information exchange
- Ensure better enforcement of arms embargoes
- Include civil society organisations in efforts to prevent small arms proliferation
However, as IANSA adds, the programme “provides no international mechanism for monitoring compliance, and the UN’s role has been limited to compiling information submitted by states on a voluntary basis.”
The United Nations Security Council have adopted and presented several resolutions dealing with the issue. However, due to the lack of international support, very little has materialized. Links to the Resolutions can be found below.
Links
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/1998/1119scres.pdf
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/1999/0924scmeeting.pdf
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/report.htm
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/angola/0012rprt.htm
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7114.doc.htm
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/2001/0904statement.pdf
